ABSTRACT Trust establishment in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is a challenging task due essentially to the high speed of vehicles, the long distances, and the network topology dynamics. Furthermore, applications context evolves quickly at the same time that the lifetime validity of data messages is short. In this paper, we set up a new distributed trust computing framework tailored to VANETs characteristics and aiming to solve the aforementioned challenges. The proposed framework is based on the investigation of the direct experience between neighboring vehicles without using any recommendation system. We also propose a tier-based messages dissemination technique in order to efficiently detect eavesdropped messages and fake events. Each vehicle checks the authenticity of the received data messages and maintains a trust value for each of its neighbors. We analytically model the trust metrics evolution of malicious vehicles. Extensive simulations are conducted to show the validity of the proposed model and evaluate the efficiency of the proposed trust computing framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of vehicles on the roads is continuously increasing at an alarming rate around the world. This influences the driving conditions and could create harsh and even hazardous driving conditions. Particularly, the number of accidents is continuously increasing which results in physical damages and victims. Drivers are also encountering increasing difficulties to reach their destinations because of intense congestions. As a result, there is a great need for drivers to be assisted by control systems and assistance applications to enhance their safety on the road particularly when urgent events occur such as accidents, congestions, bad weather conditions, etc. The automotive industry and academic researchers are moving towards inter-vehicles communications-based services provided within the context of vehicular ad-hoc networks regularly called VANETs [1] . In VANETs, vehicles will cooperate among themselves to benefit from a wide range of applications [2] . Nevertheless the open architecture of vehicular environment inevitably makes it vulnerable to many security issues. This forces vehicles to be careful about their cooperation with other peers. Vehicles exchange short messages (generally called alerts [1] ) about occurring urgent events on the road. They have then to authenticate not only the node transmitter of such messages but also the received information since a legitimate node might relay a fraudulent information. For instance, a malicious vehicle might modfy information about a real event such as the position, the time of occurrence, etc, or it might create fraudulent events which are not real in order to disturb other drivers behavior [3] . Recently, trust models are proposed as an emerging technique allowing the establishment of the minimal security level between cooperative nodes [4] - [6] . Trust computing systems target the information itself, they allow checking data reliability. Trust systems provide other network security services such as access control, authentication, malicious vehicles detection and secure resources sharing [4] , [7] , [8] . Consequently, it is important to periodically evaluate the trustworthiness of vehicles using some metrics and computational methods.
There exists two main categories of trust computing protocols: infrastructure-based and self-organized [4] . In the infrastructure-based approach, all vehicles relate to a trusted authority that provides certificates or static trust values to vehicles to be authenticated. In fact, possessing a certificate makes a vehicle almost trustworthy in the network. However, in VANETs the authentication is insufficient to decide about the trustworthiness of the vehicles because it does not target the reliability of messages. Besides, vehicles are traveling for long distances, and they are continuously confronted with other unknown vehicles that can be registered with other certification authorities in other regions. As such, infrastructure-based trust models may not be sufficient in VANETs. Regarding the self-organized trust establishment models, the trustworthiness of vehicles is built and maintained in a distributed fashion [9] , [10] . Indeed, each vehicle collects information from unknown vehicles in its neighborhood along short periods of time. The trust relationship in distributed systems can be established either directly based on mutual communications between vehicles or indirectly based on relayed information about other remote vehicles, or by combining both. In the latter, the general principle is to check many criteria related to the data messages exchanged between the vehicles in the context of e-Safety applications and the context of generation of these messages such as the position of the transmitter, the freshness of the message [11] , and the role of the transmitter vehicle in the network (usual vehicle, police, emergency vehicle, etc.) [12] . Nevertheless, these meta-data used in the majority of proposals are not sufficient to decide on the trustworthiness of the data and the vehicle itself. In fact, a malicious vehicle located in the event zone might alter correspondence messages or create fake urgent events. Furthermore, the majority of existing self-organized proposals are based on recommendations from other vehicles or from the road side units about a given vehicle [13] . However, the additional traffic generated by the recommendation requests/responses might slow down applications such as e-Safety.
In order to circumvent these shortcomings, we propose a new fully distributed trust computing framework aiming to continually evaluate the trustworthiness of vehicles and provide a reliable data transmission process. The ground principal of our protocol, termed Enhanced Distributed Trust Computing Protocol EDCTP, is that each vehicle checks the reliability of the alerts messages received from its neighbors, and maintains a trust metric reflecting the credibility of each transmitter over time. We previously proposed in [14] , a first variant of EDTCP where all vehicles reaching a trust metric value equal to 0 are deemed malicious vehicles, and consequently are definitely excluded from the network.
Our contribution in this paper is threefold. First, we propose a new tier-based approach to disseminate Alert messages in VANETs. The aim is to mitigate malicious behavior in the network and to recognize fake events which are announced by malicious vehicles before moving away from the source of the event. Secondly, we propose an enhanced distributed trust computing protocol aiming to assign trust levels to vehicles that contributed in the dissemination of alert messages. We aim to detect the largest set of fully trusted vehicles as well as all malicious vehicles without excluding them from the network as in DTCP [14] . Our proposed EDTCP is only based on the inspection of the direct experience between nodes without using of any recommendation system. Our third contribution concerns the analytical modeling using a time dependent birth-death process to investigate the efficiency of EDTCP in computing the trust metrics of malicious vehicles.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we summarize the relevant related work. In section III, we present the proposed protocol as well as the analytical modeling of the trust metric time evolution of malicious nodes. In section IV, we present the performance evaluation of our proposed framework. Section V concludes the paper and presents some future orientations.
II. RELATED WORK
We first expose relevant research proposals related to data dissemination in VANETs. Then we will present some of the relevant research work related to trust establishment in vehicular environments.
A. DATA DISSEMINATION IN VANETs
Many solutions targeting data dissemination in Vehicular networks have been proposed [15] - [17] .
In [18] , a traffic information propagation approach is proposed. Traffic is sent through two channels. A receiver verifies the message integrity by checking if messages received from both channels match correctly. In the proposed approach, vehicles in each direction of a two-way road form a separated media channel to forward messages. As such, a generated message has two separated and independent media channels to be propagated. In order to accept a message, a recipient vehicle must receive two identical messages from both directional channels to be sure that the message has not been altered. This approach is however only efficient in an urban scenario as it needs a rather high vehicle density.
In [19] , the authors dealt with the position cheating attack in the FMBA protocol [20] . In particular, the goal of this attack is to induce a delay in the broadcast of the alert messages by increasing the Contention Window of honest vehicles. They proposed a secure inter-vehicular protocol to disseminate accident warnings, resilient against the position cheating attack. In [21] , the authors proposed a new combined architecture of V2V communication, delay tolerant network and V2I communication for large scale data dissemination in VANETs. The aim is to compensate disconnections and network partitioning. A hybrid approach on message propagation is proposed in [22] for low density vehicular networks.
In [23] , Palazzi et al. proposed a novel inter-vehicles communication architecture that adapts its functionalities to serve applications by quickly propagating their messages throughout a vehicular network. Particularly, a priority scheme is proposed in order to choose the next-hop forwarder of a broadcast message based on the distance from the previous sender and the expected transmission range. They aimed to reduce redundant transmissions. In order to achieve a fast multi-hop broadcast of a message, the farthest vehicle within the transmission range is always chosen to be the next forwarder. A smart broadcast protocol is proposed in [24] where to each received message corresponds a receiving area divided into a set of non overlapping and adjacent sectors. To each sector corresponds a contention windows. Upon receiving a message, a vehicle determines the sector to which it belongs.
We note here that in all the above cited research efforts, authors tried to minimize message redundancy and data traffic, however they did not target the reliability and the authenticity of the broadcast information. In fact, the quality of information is a requirement in the context of vehicular networks where meta-data can be used to provide an assessment of the reliability of collected data. In this respect, attention should be paid to the trust properties like security, reliability, as well as data collection efficiency. In our novel framework, we proposed a new data dissemination technique where the reliability of occurring events and the authenticity of correspondent transmitted data messages are checked.
B. TRUST MANAGEMENT IN VANETS
Trust establishment is a fundamental issue in vehicular ad hoc networks since smart devices embedded on vehicles have to process and handle the data in compliance with user needs and rights. Trust provides an effective way to evaluate credibility between vehicles and to assist them to make a wise decision to communicate and collaborate with each other. In vehicular ad hoc networks, a trust model must be scalable providing the same performances independently of the size and the density of the network. The rapid change of the road conditions remains one of the issues and challenges facing trust establishment in VANETs. Exchanged information needs to be evaluated according to its particular context [9] , [12] . In addition, a vehicle must be able to trust the received information in a reasonable short time [3] , [4] , [25] , [26] .
In [27] , Tajeddine et al. proposed an approach to preserve the privacy of users in their proposed reputation-based trust model. To this end, vehicles are organized off-line into groups. Each group has a manager, a unique identifier and a unique signature. Additionally, each group has a reputation value. When a vehicle v receives messages reporting the road state from one or more vehicles belonging to the same group g v , it first calculates an average of all road states S(g v ). Then, v calculates the total road state TS combining all the road states received from all groups. After deciding about the real state of the road using TS, vehicle v updates the group reputation value by comparing S(g v ) to the TS. If S(g v ) is equal to TS, the group reputation will be increased otherwise it will be decreased. In this approach, the reputation of the group is correlated with the behavior of each member. As such, the approach is not resilient against a collusion attack when a set of vehicles belonging to a given group broadcast false information using the credentials of the same group. The authors did not describe any technique about forming the groups on the road, yet another shortcoming of this approach is the absence of trust values for the vehicles in order to punish malicious ones.
In [28] , the authors proposed a fuzzy approach to decide whether to accept a warning message from other vehicles based on the trustworthiness of the issuer. To this end, vehicles are classified according to their calculated reputation scores into three categories represented by fuzzy sets. First, each vehicle v computes a trust score for each other vehicle j. It takes into account recommendations from other vehicles about vehicle j, the old reputation score that v holds on j and the recommendations about vehicle j from eventual road side units (RSUs). Then, vehicle v projects the reputation score of j on one of the fuzzy sets and according to the set to which vehicle j belongs to, vehicle v decides about trusting the information received from j. In this model, authors assumed that vehicle v requests its neighbors about the reputation of vehicle j which might cause supplementary network traffic. Furthermore, both sending recommendation requests to and receiving responses from RSUs need additional time. In addition, the proposed approach can discard a high number of correct messages.
The authors in [29] proposed a data-based trust model for ephemeral networks. First, each vehicle computes a report about an event by combining two types of information: static information such as the type of vehicle and the event type and dynamically changing information such as the security state of the vehicle and its location. Then all those trustworthiness reports about the same event are combined and their validity is inferred by a decision module using an evaluation technique such as weighted voting and Bayesian Inference to decide if the reported event really occurred. Using this model, only trust on data is checked, however the trust between vehicles is not established.
In [30] it has been proposed to classify vehicles encountering the same traffic event into different roles in order to determine whether the received information is trustworthy. In fact, when a vehicle receives a traffic message from an event reporter, it observes whether the behavior of the reporter corresponds to the standard behavior. In the affirmative, the vehicle accepts the message and calculates its reputation value by combining the role of the reporter and the reputation values of the received event from other vehicles using a fuzzy approach. We notice that this solution is not realistic since authors relied on the behavior of the vehicle reporter of the event to decide about a traffic message.
In [31] , Dotzer et al. proposed a hybrid approach using a piggybacking technique. In their proposal, a trustworthiness opinion is appended to each message reporting an event. The drawback of this proposal is that the first opinion appended to the message affects other opinions because its computing is recursive. It is based on the opinion received in the message. In [32] , the authors considered a subset of trusted vehicles in the network called anchors. They assumed that the anchors broadcast only reliable messages. The data validation is ensured either by comparing the received data with other vehicles agreement or with the data received from the anchors. The validation process is only accurate when a high number of reports is received from other vehicles.
Shaik and Alzaharani proposed in [11] a new approach aiming to filter out malicious vehicles. It is based on the detection of false location and time information. The scheme consists of three interrelated steps. First a vehicle calculates a confidence value for each data message received from its neighbors. This confidence value is computed as a function of the location closeness of the vehicle to the event location and the time received in the data message compared to the instant of the event occurrence. Then, a trust value for each message is computed based on the confidence value. This trust value is used to decide about the forwarding of the message. However, the location and the time verification are only accurate if the receiver receives the signal directly from the sender otherwise the false positive rate gets too high. In [12] , the authors proposed a data centric approach based also on the location closeness of the reporter to the event and the freshness of the data. However, the location metric is not sufficient to decide about the legitimacy of the transmitted data and the trustworthiness of the transmitter as the message may emanate from a malicious vehicle located near the event.
In [33] and [34] , proposals are based on the DempsterShafer theorem (DST) [35] . DST is used in order to combine many independent beliefs about a given vehicle in order to compute the trust metrics. The shortcoming of such an approach is due to old beliefs received from other nodes. Furthermore, erroneous trust beliefs about a vehicle might induce an erroneous computed trust metric.
Trust is also used in designing secure routing protocols [36] , [37] . In [38] , the authors proposed TROUVE which is a trust based routing protocol for vehicular networks. Each node stores information about its neighbors including the Packet Drop Ratio (PDR) and Packet Sent Ratio (PSR). In order to compute the trust metric, each vehicle compares the PDR and the PSR to a given threshold and updates the trust metric accordingly.
In this paper, we propose an Enhanced and Distributed Trust Computing Protocol (EDTCP) to compute and maintain the trust levels. Our protocol is fully distributed where each vehicle evaluates the trust level of its 1-hop neighbors from which it receives alert messages without using any internal or external recommendations. Trust evaluation is based on the assessment of the authenticity of transmitted messages. To this end, we propose a new data dissemination technique aiming to filter out non authentic events and to mitigate the impact of falsified data transmitted by malicious nodes. Each node evaluates the authenticity of announced events transmitted by its neighbors and updates their trust levels over the time according to its observations.
III. AN ENHANCED TRUST COMPUTING PROTOCOL
First, we describe the new tier-based alerts dissemination technique. Then, we present our new trust computing protocol and the analytical modeling of the trust metric of malicious vehicles.
A. A TIER-BASED ALERTS DISSEMINATION APPROACH 1) PRELIMINARIES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The purpose of vehicular networks is to equip vehicles with the capability of communication and to provide many services aiming to assist drivers and to enhance their safety on the road. Those services provide information to drivers regarding meteorologic conditions, obstacles, accidents, traffic jam, etc. Information are received from the neighbors of the vehicle or from sensors embedded on the vehicle itself. In fact, vehicles exchange data messages, conventionally called alerts [39] , about their surrounding in order to share their observations and inform remote vehicles about occurring events on the road. Furthermore, the transmission of alert messages is periodic and their size is reduced. Conventionally, an alert message contains a description of the occurring event such as position, instant of occurrence, intensity of caused damage, etc [2] , [40] . However, some malicious vehicles may claim harmful non-existent events, and broadcast fake messages in order to create certain situations on the roads. For example, a malicious vehicle for its own purpose sends fake messages in order to inform other vehicles about non-existent traffic jam, accident, or closed road. This malicious behavior is regularly called bogus information attack [41] .
In our network model, we assume there is a set of generators of events. They are used to model events to occur on the roads. These event generators are randomly dispersed within the network. Let N e denote the numbers of such generators. To each event e corresponds a binary authentication value denoted by e.auth. We accordingly distinguish between two types of events depending on the value of e.auth:
• e.auth = 1: event e is authentic. It has occurred on the road and it is observed/detected by all vehicles (malicious and non malicious) it its vicinity.
• e.auth = 0: event e is fictitious. It is only observed/detected by malicious vehicles. Event e is designated with a unique identifier denoted by e.id, position (x, y) and occurrence instant t e . Authentic events are used to simulate events that really occurred on the road such as accidents and traffic congestion. However, fictitious events are used to simulate non real events which are created and broadcasted/forwarded by malicious vehicles.
Vehicles on the roads should be alerted about occurring (authentic) events. We define a geographic area called detection zone Z D centered at the coordinates (x, y) of event e with radius d. All vehicles within zone Z D should be informed/alerted about such an event either directly or via multi hop communications. However, event e is only directly observed/detected by vehicles in a smaller observation zone Z O using their embedded sensors. The radius < d of the observation zone Z O is only a fraction of the radius of the larger detection zone Z D .
Recall that an authentic event e, (e.auth = 1), should be detected by all the vehicles currently within the observation zone Z O . However, a fictitious event e, e.auth = 0, is only VOLUME 6, 2018 observed by the malicious vehicles currently within zone Z O . Non malicious vehicles do not detect fictitious events.
2) ADVERSARY MODEL
Malicious vehicles might alter transmitted messages and/or transmit non authentic information which if not detected and purged would hinder the reliability and efficiency of the applications. In the present work, we consider two aspects of misbehavior. Firstly, a malicious vehicle v inverses the authenticity of an authentic event with probability P r m (v). Each vehicle has its own value of P r m (v) in [0, 1]. Secondly, a malicious vehicle might broadcast fake messages about fictitious events.
Upon the detection of an event on the road, a vehicle informs its neighborhood by broadcasting Alert messages. We here propose a new data dissemination technique to propagate the Alert messages to remote vehicles. 
3) ALERT MESSAGES DISSEMINATION a: EVENTS DETECTION
Alert messages are triggered in zone Z O upon the direct detection/sensing of an event, then they are progressively relayed throughout zone Z D . To this end, the dissemination is organized into tiers. Detection zone Z D is divided into L + 1 tiers as sketched on Fig.1 . Each tier i has radius l i and centered at coordinates (x, y) of event e:
Where r is the average transmission range of vehicles. Each event generator triggers authentic and non authentic events according to a Poisson process with parameter τ . Each event remains alive a period of time t during which warning beacons denoted WARNING are periodically broadcast by the event generator in Z O with rate λ 1 . These WARNING represent the periodic signals to be detected by the vehicles embedded sensors and therefore related to the vehicles onboard units [40] . 
Field e.auth indicates whether event e is authentic, and seq is the sequence number of the message, seq = 1.. ( t × λ 1 ) .
Upon the detection of a WARNING about an event e, vehicle v action depends on its nature being malicious or not and on the field e.auth received within the beacon:
• If field e.auth is equal to 1, this indicates that event e is authentic, then regardless of its nature being malicious or not, vehicle v broadcasts an ALERT message. An ALERT message describes the event such as its geographic position and its instant of occurrence, in addition to an authenticity value denoted A v (e) set by vehicle v:
Authenticity field A v (e) is set by vehicle v before transmitting its ALERT. The value of A v (e) depends on the behavior of vehicle v: if vehicle v is malicious then field A v (e) is set to 0 with probability P r m (v), otherwise A v (e) is set to 1:
The processing of WARNING beacons by non-malicious vehicles is sketched on Fig.2 . • If field e.auth is equal to 0 which indicates that event e is fictitious, then vehicle v transmits an ALERT only if it is malicious. Non-malicious vehicles do not perceive fictitious WARNING in Z O . Authenticity field A v (e) is set to 1 with probability P r m (v), otherwise it is set to 0. The processing of WARNING beacons by malicious vehicles is sketched on Fig.3 . Here, it is worth to mention that transmissions to the next tier are randomized on a transmission interval denoted by τ 1 in order to avoid collisions among ALERT messages emanating from the same tier.
b: PROCESSING OF ALERT MESSAGES
The processing of ALERT messages primarily depends on the position of the receiving vehicle (hereafter called the monitor) and the transmitting vehicle (hereafter called the monitored vehicle) with respect to event e. Consider a monitor vehicle M . Upon the receipt of an ALERT message from vehicle v, monitor M computes the distance that separates it from the event position (e.x, e.y) using equation 4:
Where (M .x, M .y) are the current coordinates of vehicle M . We assume that all vehicles are equipped with a GPS (Global Positioning System) in order to determine their positions.
Vehicle M gets its current tier as follows:
Recall that is the radius of observation zone Z O , and r is the transmission range of vehicles.
Three cases are distinguished based on the current tier of M : tier(M ) = 0, tier(M ) = 1 and tier(M ) > 1.
In the first case, monitor M is in zone Z O (tier(M ) = 0) of event e. Upon receiving an ALERT message from vehicle v in Z O , one of the following cases occurs depending on the authentication A v (e) received in the ALERT and whether or not monitor M has observed/detected event e: 
1) M has already observed event e in

id).
In the second case, monitor M is in the first tier (tier(M ) = 1). If it receives an ALERT from vehicle v in zone Z O about event e, then it waits a maximum period of time τ 2 during which it might receive other similar messages from other vehicles in Z O about the same event e. At the same time, vehicle M might receive one or more DECLARE beacons indicating that event e is fictitious. In this latter case, vehicle M immediately suspends timer τ 2 and deduces that event e is fictitious. However, if monitor M has not received any DECLARE message in period τ 2 , then upon the expiration of τ 2 , it considers that event e is authentic. The action of monitor M upon the receipt of an ALERT message in tier i = 1 is sketched in Fig.5 .
Tier 1 is used as a filter zone of non authentic events (i.e., a non-authentic event should not be transmitted beyond tier 1). The rationale behind using a waiting period ÏĎ2 is twofold. It enforces the inspection of all received ALERT and VOLUME 6, 2018 DECLARE Messages emanating from zone Z O to properly decide upon the authenticity of the ALERT messages. But also, only one unique ALERT or DECLARE Message is then transmitted about the same event. The later fact has the nice property to reduce the required signaling cost of our proposed EDTCP.
Regarding the third case, monitor M is in tier tier(M ) > 1. It considers only ALERT messages that emanate from vehicles in tier tier(M )−1. Unlike the previous case where monitor M waits the expiration of period τ 2 in order to decide upon the authenticity of the event, here monitor M checks only field A v (e). If A v (e) = 1 then monitor M considers event e authentic. However, if field A v (e) = 0, monitor M considers that the message was falsified by its transmitter v.
Similarly to tier i = 1, vehicles in tiers i > 1 transmit ALERT messages only if the event is authentic. Malicious nodes in tiers i ≥ 1 set the authenticity of events in transmitted ALERT messages according to their P r m . Indeed, the value A v (e) is set to 0 with probability P r m (M ), and to 1 otherwise. The action of monitor M upon receiving ALERT messages beyond tier i = 1 is portrayed in the bottom part of Fig.5 .
Our dissemination technique guaranties that there are no possible collisions between waves of ALERTs coming from different tiers about the same event given no two nodes from three consecutive tiers transmit simultaneously. This is satisfied if the following condition holds: Each vehicle monitors the behavior of its neighbors, at the same time, it is monitored by all vehicles that receive its ALERT messages. However, trust metrics are not symmetric which means that T m (M , v) may be different from T m (v, M ). Furthermore, a malicious vehicle behaves illegally only when it transmits ALERT messages, the case where a malicious monitor assigns false trust metrics to its monitored vehicles is out of the scope of the paper. Independently of the current tier of monitor M and the tier of transmitter vehicle v, the trust metric of vehicle v is increased each time vehicle v transmits an authentic ALERT message about an authentic event e where field A v (e) is set to 1. In this case, T m (M , v) will be increased by a step ξ . Otherwise, vehicle v is punished by decreasing its trust metric T m (M , v) by a step ξ . Table 1 summarizes the different cases.
C. ANALYTICAL MODELING OF TRUST METRICS EVOLUTION FOR MALICIOUS VEHICLES
In this section, we are interested in the evolution of the trust metric of malicious vehicles through time as a function of P r m . As previously specified, two types of malicious behavior are considered. A malicious vehicle v either inverses the authenticity of events in ALERT with probability P r m (v) or it sends fake ALERT messages about fictitious events.
Let N e represents the number of event generators within the network. Each event generator triggers events according to Whenever monitor M detects that monitored vehicle v transmitted an erroneous event authenticity, it decreases
by ξ as summarized in table 1. Our aim here is to analytically investigate the efficiency of EDTCP in computing trust metrics of malicious nodes. Particularly, a malicious vehicle should have on average, a trust metric that does not exceed 0.8 in order to build a distributed public key infrastructure (PKI) as we detailed in our previous work [42] . Indeed, a vehicle acquiring a trust metric in the range [0.8 − 1] can assume the role of a Gateway authority, and each one acquiring full trust can assume the role of either a Registration authority or a Certification authority to establish the distributed PKI [42] .
We model trust metric state changes by a time-dependent birth-death process (M /M /1/N queue) where all birth coefficients are denoted by λ and the death coefficients are denoted by µ.
Let χ t > 0 be the random variable that denotes the state of monitored vehicle v at instant t computed by its monitor M . It means that if vehicle v is in state n, n = 0..
Let P n (t) denotes the transient probability of vehicle v being in state n at time t. It is equivalent to the probability that χ t = n.
Based on equation 6, we readily deduce P n (t) as follows:
In order to express the birth and death coefficients, we distinguish two cases according to the authenticity of the detected event.
For an authentic event, a malicious vehicle v transmits an ALERT without changing the authenticity with probability 1 − P r m . As such, a birth process arises results in a transition from state n to state n + 1 where n < N . We must recall here that vehicle v transmits ALERT messages according to a Poisson process with parameter λ 1 . The birth rate λ is then:
Malicious vehicle v changes the authenticity with probability P r m . This malicious behavior when detected by monitor M, the trust metric T m (M , v) transits from state n to state n−1 (n > 0). The death rate µ is then:
Non authentic events are only detected and transmitted by malicious vehicles. These transmissions will be detected by monitors within zones Z o and Z 1 and therefore λ is always nullified.
Regarding death coefficient µ in case of detection of a non authentic event, we express it separately in each zone (0, 1, >= 2) because, as we previously explained, there is no transmission of ALERT messages about non authentic events beyond zone 1. The solution to transient probability P n (t) should obey to the following differential equations system (Fig.6 ):
Initially at t = 0, we assume that each malicious vehicle has a trust metric equal to 0.5 which is equivalent to state N /2. Hence the initial distribution function of P n (t) is as follows.
We refer to the work of Tarabia [43] in order to resolve differential equations where he used the Laplace VOLUME 6, 2018 transform method. Probability P n (t) for a malicious vehicle v to be in state n at instant t is as follows:
Where:
And:
For λ = µ, P n (t) is given by:
We express now the expected state of vehicle v which is denoted by ES as follows:
Based on equation 16, we get for λ = µ:
Based on equation 17, we get the expected state ES for λ = µ:
As we previously mentioned, the trust metric of a malicious vehicle should not exceed 0.8 which corresponds to state n = 8 when ξ = 0.1 and therefore N = 10. To this end we are interested in the probability that a malicious vehicle is in state n ≥ 8 denoted by PS (8) . In case of λ = µ, PS is expressed as follows:
Regarding the case of λ = µ, probability P n = 1/(N + 1) for n = 0..N . Hence, based on equation 21 we get for k = 8 where ξ = 0.1 and N = 10:
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Throughout this section, we will validate our model and ascertain the efficiency of EDTCP using an extensive set of simulation.
A. SIMULATION SETUP
We considered an urban area network of dimensions 4000m × 4000m. It consists of 9 intersections as sketched on Fig.7 . Every two intersections are separated by 1000m. In this scenario, vehicles are moving toward different directions with an average speed of 55km/h . The vehicles enter to the network from all edges end points with an arrival rate of 0.1 vehicle/second from each entry, also each vehicle arbitrary picks out its destination. Events generators are localized at roads intersections as portrayed on Fig.7 . The authenticity of events depends on the percentage of authentic events N eT . Indeed, each generator transmits a percentage of authentic events equal to N eT alternatively with non authentic events (100 − N eT ). VOLUME 6, 2018 We consider a transient period of 200s. Let us note also that simulations are repeated enough to attain 95% of confidence interval. Table 2 portrays the rest of the simulation parameters.
B. SIMULATION RESULTS
1) THE EXPECTED STATE ES
Firstly, we are interested in the expected state ES of a malicious vehicle (equation 18 and equation 19) . We plot in figures 8 and 9, both simulation and analytical results as a function of the simulation time and P r m . Results are plotted separately for each zone: 0, 1 and 2. It is worth mentioning that in simulation results, we plot the average ES among all malicious vehicles that are localized within the same zone.
In Fig.8 , N eT is equal to 0%, which means that all generated and detected events are non authentic. We plot the expected state ES only in zone 0 because non authentic events are not transmitted beyond it, as we previously mentioned. As expected, we clearly remark that all malicious vehicles are in state 0 independently of the simulation time and their P r m . This is due to the fact that the detection of non-authentic events will trigger the broadcast of only non-authentic messages which lead to a continuous decrease of the trust metrics (from the default value 0.5 to 0). Recall here that we restrict our attention to the trust metric of malicious vehicles. Now, according to the plots of Fig.9 which correspond to N eT = 100%, we remarkably notice that the expected state ES decreases inversely to P r m in all the plots corresponding to the different tiers 0, 1 and 2. This is due to the fact that the more P r m raises the more the malicious vehicle transmits non-authentic ALERT messages. Furthermore, we observe on Fig.9a that the expected trust metric is less than 0.05 in case of P r m = 0.8 for both analytical and simulation results. This observation is also valid on figures 9b and 9c.
We observe in case of P r m = 0.5, the trust metric is between 0.4 and 0.55 on figures 9a and 9c which correspond to zones 0 and 2, respectively. However, the oscillations of the curve become more acute and vary between 0.4 and 0.6 on Fig.9b corresponding to zone 1. This behavior is mainly due to two facts. Firstly, in zone 1 the monitor should wait a period of time equal to τ 2 in order to check the authenticity of the received messages. Recall that period τ 2 is required to collect ALERT emanating from zone 0. Upon only the expiration of τ 2 , that a monitor checks their authenticity. However, ALERT authenticity check and ALERT transmission to the next zone are carried out instantaneously in zone 0 and 2. Secondly, after the event authenticity check in zone 1, a unique ALERT message is eventually transmitted to tier 2. The number of messages emanating from tier 1 are less than those emanating from tier 0 and 2. This leads to a faster convergence of the trust metric to the average (0.5 figure in 9) in tiers 0 and 2 than in tier 1.
We notice also on Fig.9 , that the average trust metric of a malicious vehicle having P r m = 1 is always equal to 0 because in this case it only transmits non authentic messages. Consequently, its trust metric could never increase. It is worth mentioning also that the difference between the analytical and the simulation results is very small independently of the zone and the value of P r m which indicates the validity of the analytical model in representing the trust metric evolution.
2) PROBABILITY PS
Now, we turn to the investigation of the probability for a malicious vehicle to have a trust metric greater than 0.8, it is denoted by PS(8) (equation 22) . To this end, we plot on figures 10 and 11 the probability PS(8) as a function of the simulation time and P r m for both the analytical model and the simulation for N eT equal to 0 and 100%, respectively.
As depicted on Fig.10 where N eT = 0, the probability PS(8) is equal to 0 in zone 0 independently of P r m . This means that a malicious vehicle can never reach a trust metric greater than 0.8 in zone 0. This observation is an immediate result of Fig.8 where the trust metric is equal to 0 independently of P r m . It is also interesting to note that when the percentage of authentic events N eT increases to 100%, the probability PS (8) slightly increases for P r m >= 0.6, it is less that 0.05 in tiers 0, 1 and 2. However, in the case of P r m = 0.5, the analytical result for PS (8) is 0.27, however the simulation provides an average of 0.25 for tier 0 and an average of 0.2 for tier 2, while the average oscillates between 0.2 and 0.3 in tier 1. Indeed, the presence of authentic events is an opportunity for malicious vehicles to transmit more authentic ALERT messages according to their P r m , particularly in case of P r m = 0.5. Consequently, the trust metric of malicious vehicles increases for each transmitted authentic ALERT message. Here again, we remark that the difference between the analytic and simulations results is adequately small. To sum up, EDTCP does not allow malicious vehicles having to reach a trust metric higher than or equal to 0.8. This result is required in order to built a distributed PKI [42] .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new trust computing protocol called EDTCP for VANETs. The aim is to monitor vehicles behavior in order to detect the largest set of fully trusted vehicles. Furthermore, we proposed a new data dissemination technique based on tiers in order to mitigate the impact of vehicles misbehavior, and detect virtually all malicious vehicles. In the proposed framework, each vehicle checks the authenticity of the messages received from its neighborhood, and then assigns to the transmitter a trust metric. This trust metric is continuously updated depending on the authenticity of the received messages. We modeled the evolution of the trust metric of malicious vehicles using a time dependent M /M /1/N process. Extensive simulations were performed to show the validity of the proposed model and to evaluate the efficiency of EDTCP. Other aspects of misbehavior are being considered as an extension to our proposed framework. 
